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Abstract
Derivatives are a special type of financial contracts used to hedge risks or to spec-
ulate on the market fluctuations. In order to avoid ambiguities and misinterpre-
tations, several domain specific languages (DSLs) for specifying such derivatives
have been proposed. The recent development of the blockchain technologies en-
ables the automatic execution of financial derivatives. Once deployed on the
blockchain, a derivative cannot be modified. Therefore, more caution should be
taken in order to avoid undesired situations.
In this paper, we address the formal verification of financial derivatives writ-
ten in a DSL for blockchain, called Findel. We identify a list of properties that,
once proved, they exclude several security vulnerabilities (e.g., immutable bugs,
money losses). We develop an infrastructure that provides means to interac-
tively formalize and prove such properties. To provide a higher confidence, we
also generate proof certificates. We use our infrastructure to certify non-trivial
examples that cover the most common types of derivatives (forwards/futures,
swaps, options).
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1. Introduction
Financial derivatives [1, 2, 3, 4] play an important role in finance. A financial
derivative is a contract between two or more parties whose value is based on
underlying financial assets (e.g., bonds, commodities, etc.). The term derivative
captures the idea that the contract derives its value from fluctuations in the
underlying asset. For instance, a car insurance contract derives its value from
an insurance index and related events (e.g., an accident may change its value).
Derivatives are often used to express complex agreements. Suppose that
John is a cereal manufacturer and Tom is a farmer who produces wheat and
corn. Since the price of cereals fluctuates a lot, John believes that it would be a
very good idea to have an agreement with Tom at the beginning of the year: he
computes a convenient price and makes an offer to Tom for buying his products
in advance. If Tom agrees, then John will not be affected by a rise in the price
at the end of the year. If the price drops, then Tom will have an advantage.
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Should John and Tom decide to accept this agreement, they can make accurate
predictions for the future.
Typically, financial derivatives are expressed using natural language on a
written document which is authorized by a trusted third party. However, natural
language is often ambiguous and lacks precision. This might cause disputes
between the parties involved, even in the presence of a trusted authority.
         Ethereum Smart Contract for Findel
     
Ethereum Blockchain Environment
Step 1: John issues a Findel
derivative by calling the
Ethreum smart contract for
Findel
Step 2: Tom joins John's
issued derivative through the
same smart contract for Findel
Step 3: The Findel
derivative is executed
by mining nodes in the
Ethereum network
An Ethereum smart contract
manages Findel derivatives.
Users can register, issue, and
join Findel derivatives using the
functionalities exposed by this
smart contract.
Figure 1: Findel derivatives are managed by an Ethereum smart contract [5] implemented
in Solidity [6]. Scenario: John issues a derivative using the Ethereum smart contract; the
derivative is now available and anyone can join it. Here, Tom joins the derivative issued by
John through the same smart contract. Tom becomes the owner of the derivative and the
derivative is executed by the miners in the network.
Domain Specific Languages for financial derivatives. In order to avoid disputes,
researchers have proposed simple, non-ambiguous, and executable domain spe-
cific languages (DSLs) for describing financial derivatives. Jones et al. [7]
proposed such a language which was implemented as a combinator library in
Haskell. They have defined a minimal and expressive set of primitives, which
are then used to create complex derivatives. An example is One(EUR) - a primi-
tive for transferring one unit of currency (EUR) from one party to another. New
derivatives can be created from basic ones: e.g., Scale(k, One(EUR)) multi-
plies by k the amount to be transferred. Derivatives expressed using primitives
are composable. For example, And(c1,c2) processes the derivatives c1 and c2
sequentially. Jones et al. [7] were able to compute the value of a derivative by
giving a valuation semantics to their Haskell combinators.
Another language in the same family has been proposed by Gaillourdet [8].
It uses similar primitives as in Jones et al. [7] and has a denotational semantics.
One of the design goals was to enable standard mathematical analysis, i.e., study
whether sequences of payments are consistent with the contract descriptions.
The blockchain technology enables automatic processing of financial deriva-
tives via smart contracts. In this context, new DSLs for derivatives have emerged:
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Findel [9], Marlowe [10], and a contract language introduced by Egelund-Mu¨ller
et al. [11].
Blockchain. The blockchain technology is used mainly by cryptocurrencies such
as Bitcoin [12]. It involves a peer-to-peer network of nodes that communicate
with the purpose of contributing to a distributed ledger. This ledger is a chain
of blocks of transactions. Only a special category of nodes, called miners, con-
tribute to the creation of blocks. Their role is to arrange transactions in blocks
in a way that requires computing power. Miners receive a reward as incentive.
A block is added to the main ledger by a consensus algorithm. The consensus
algorithm ensures that it is not convenient to change the existing ledger, but
only to add new blocks to it. This is why the blockchain is said to be immutable.
Various blockchain platforms such as Ethereum [13, 14] or Cardano [15] allow
users to create smart contracts, i.e., programs that typically handle transactions
involving cryptocurrency, but they can also encode complex logic like regular
programs. Miners are incentivised by an execution fee.
Vulnerabilities in Findel. In this paper we focus on Findel, a DSL based on a
set of primitives which is very similar with the set proposed by Jones et al. [7]
and Gaillourdet [8]. The main difference is that Findel derivatives can be auto-
matically executed in Ethereum (Figure 1). Findel can be regarded as a smart
contracts language for financial derivatives. Therefore, Findel inherits several
vulnerabilities of smart contracts. A comprehensive taxonomy of vulnerabilities
of smart contracts can be found in [16]. We recall here the vulnerabilties that
are relevant for Findel:
• Immutable bugs. Due to the immutability of the blockchain, deployed
Findel code cannot be modified. This is consistent with the principles of
Ethereum, where code is law. If the Findel code contains a bug, there is
no direct way to fix it.
• Money lost in transfer. When sending money, one has to specify the
correct recipient address. Money sent to wrong addresses are lost forever.
• Time constraints. In Findel, time constraints are part of the language: a
contract issuer can specify time intervals when contracts can be joined. If
an interested owner fails to join in time, then the owner may lose money
or other contracts.
Programming smart contracts is a tricky task and developers need tools to
verify whether their programs are more secure. In this context, formal verifica-
tion of smart contracts has started to be a very active field [17, 18, 19, 20, 21].
Most of the tools based on formal verification focus on verifying general security
properties of the Ethereum bytecode (e.g., [22]).
Handling vulnerabilities in Findel. Many vulnerabilities are caused by a mis-
alignment between the intuition of the programmer and the semantics of the lan-
guage. The main sources of vulnerabilities in Findel are two statements that (1)
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allow participants to swap the parties (issuer and owner) and (2) generate new
contracts. We show here a list of properties that, once verified, could exclude
certain vulnerabilities (e.g., immutable bugs, money losses) for the derivative in
question:
(CM) Derivatives should be free of calculation mistakes. This is a typical bug in
financial contracts where mistakes in mathematical formulas could lead to
wrong amounts of money to be transferred. In the real world, this is can
be corrected. Unfortunately, a bug in a deployed Findel derivative cannot
be fixed at all, due to immutability of the blockchain.
(ES) Errors caused by external sources should be handled properly. Findel al-
lows users to retrieve data from external sources using gateways. A simple
example is a Findel currency exchange contract, where the exchange rate
is provided by an external source. Suppose that Charlie wants to ex-
change $10 into euros. So, he joins the issued contract and pays the $10.
If the external source fails to provide an exchange rate and the Findel code
does not handle such situations properly, then Charlie receives nothing in
exchange, and losses the $10.
(AS) Accidental swaps should be avoided. This property ensures that the gener-
ated transactions and contracts have the intended issuer and the intended
owner. Although this may seem easy to check, sometimes this is quite
difficult to detect when statements (1) and (2) are combined. In Findel,
the execution of a contract is triggered when someone joins an issued con-
tract. Moreover, you cannot force someone to join. Suppose that John
issues c1 which specifies that: (a) he pays in advance for cereals, and (b) a
new contract c2 with John as issuer is generated (by c1), where c2 specifies
that John must receive cereals in exchange. If Tom joins c1, then Tom
receives the payment and he is expected to join c2. However, if Tom is
dishonest and he does not join c2, then John never gets the cereals! The
problem is that the execution of c2 depends on Tom, and he might not be
interested in joining it.1.
In this paper we tackle the formal verification of this kind of properties
for Findel contracts. We develop an infrastructure implemented in Coq [23]2,
that provides means to execute Findel derivatives, and to formalize, prove, and
certify properties about them.
Compared to the other formal verification approaches, these are mostly fo-
cused on formalizing and proving generic security properties of Ethereum byte-
code [18, 21], and only a few actually certify these properties [22, 19].
Compared to the other DSLs [7, 8] in the same family as Findel, none of
them are designed to be executed on the blockchain. They are mostly focused
1In Section 2.1.1 we discuss this particular issue in detail.
2The source code is available online: https://github.com/andreiarusoaie/
findel-semantics-coq
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on computing derivatives values or performing conformance analyses. Here we
focus is different: we prove properties that make sense when such derivatives
are executed in the blockchain.
Contributions. The contributions of this paper are:
1. A formal semantics of Findel in Coq [23].
2. An infrastructure that can be used to certify security properties for the
most common types of derivatives (futures/forwards, swaps, options).
3. A list of examples that highlight the various security properties that
derivatives have. We use our infrastructure to prove these properties.
When a proof of a security property cannot be completed, we show how
to detect the source of the problem.
4. A practical method for developing proofs for complex derivatives. Since
Findel is composable, proofs can be divided into smaller manageable
pieces. We show that proofs of complex derivatives can be done by com-
posing smaller proofs.
Paper organisation. Section 2 introduces the syntax and the informal semantics
of Findel from [9]. Section 2.1.1 contains a motivating example and we discuss
what properties are violated by this example. The Coq encoding of Findel is
shown in Section 3. Using the Coq semantics we encode several Findel deriva-
tives and then we prove their expected properties in Section 4. We also include
a credit default swap - a very popular type of derivative - and we show how its
proofs can be developed incrementally in Section 4.5. We conclude in Section 5.
2. Findel: a DSL for financial derivatives
The syntax and the informal semantics of the Findel language are both
described in Biryukov et al. [9]. Details can be found in the implementation
available at https://github.com/cryptolu/findel. In this section we use
both sources in order to make a complete description of the language. We do
not improve Findel here, we only to formalise its existing semantics.
A Findel contract is a tuple with three components: a description, an issuer
and an owner. The issuer and the owner are the parties of the given contract.
In the implementation, the issuer and the owner are represented as 20-byte val-
ues (i.e., size of an Ethereum account address), and contracts have an additional
component called proposed owner which is also a 20-byte value. This new com-
ponent is used to propose a specific owner when issuing a new contract. If the
proposed owner field is 0x0 (default value), then anyone can join the contract.
A Findel description is essentially a tree with basic primitives as leaves and
composite primitives as internal nodes. The list of available primitives and their
informal semantics is shown in Table 1.
Example 2.1. And is a primitive that executes two (sub)contracts, c1 and c2,
sequentially. If at least one of them fails then the changes are reverted. Here is
a fixed-rate currency exchange derivative in Findel:
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Primitive Informal semantics
Zero Do nothing.
One(currency) Transfer 1 unit of currency from
the issuer to the owner.
Scale(k, c) Multiply all payments of c by a
constant factor of k.
ScaleObs(a, c) Multiply all payments of c by a
factor obtained from address a.
Give(c) Swap parties of c.
And(c1, c2) Execute c1 and then c2.
Or(c1, c2) Give the owner the right to execute
either c1 or c2 but not both
If(a, c1, c2) If b is true, execute c1, else execute
c2, with b obtained from address a.
Timebound(t0, t1, c) Execute c, if the current timestamp
is within [t0, t1].
Table 1: The informal semantics of Findel [9].
Additional syntax Desugared syntax
At(t0, c) Timebound(t0 − δ, t0 + δ, c),
where δ is just a constant used
to handle the imperfect precision
of time signals in the network
Before(t0, c) Timebound(now, t0, c),
where now is the current time
After(t0, c) Timebound(t0, ∞, c).
Table 2: Additional primitives
And(Give(Scale(11, One(USD))),
Scale(10, One(EUR))).
To increase the expressivity of Findel, the language is extended with some
sugar syntax as shown in Table 2.
Example 2.2. A zero-coupon bond (ZCB) can be encoded using At:
And(Give(Scale(10, One(USD))),
At(now +t, Scale(11, One(USD))))
The execution model of a Findel contract is given by these steps [9]:
1. The first party issues a contract. This is a mere declaration of the issuer’s
desire to conclude an agreement and entails no obligations.
2. The second party joins the contract and becomes its owner. As a conse-
quence, both parties accept the specified rights and obligations.
3. The contract is executed immediately:
(a) Let the current node be the root of the contract description. If the
current node is either Or or Timebound with t0 > now , postpone
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the execution: issue a new contract, with the same parties and the
current node as root. The owner can demand later its execution.
(b) Otherwise, execute all sub-nodes recursively.
(c) Delete the contract.
Example 2.3. A step by step execution of the contract in Example 2.1, where
Alice issues and Bob is the owner:
1. Alice issues the contract and Bob joins it, becoming the contract owner:
$ e is owner of
Alice 100 50 -
Bob 20 30 And(Give(
Scale(11, One(USD)))
Scale(10, One(EUR)))
2. And executes and Bob is now the owner of two (sub)contracts:
$ e is owner of
Alice 100 50 -
Bob 20 30 Give(Scale(11, One(USD)))
Scale(10, One(EUR))
3. Give executes and Alice becomes an owner:
$ e is owner of
Alice 100 50 Scale(11, One(USD))
Bob 20 30 Scale(10, One(EUR))
4. Alice receives 11 USD from Bob:
$ e is owner of
Alice 111 50 -
Bob 9 30 Scale(10, One(EUR))
5. Finally, Bob receives 10 EUR from Alice:
$ e is owner of
Alice 111 40 -
Bob 9 40 -
The implementation of Findel does not enforce any constraints on the bal-
ances of the users that prevents them from building up debt.
2.1. Limitations of Findel
Findel has several major limitations. First, there is no way to encode repet-
itive behavior in contracts - there are no loops. This is a limitation when one
wants to specify a contract should be executed repeatedly for 10 years.
Second, by design, Findel is not able to express agreements for more than
two parties. One can access external gateways to simulate multiple parties, but
this is a very limited workaround.
2.1.1. A motivating example
Recall our cereal manufacturer example from Section 1. Suppose that John
issues the following option derivative (here, wheat is represented by USD and
corn by EUR):
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OPT =∆ And
(
Before(t,Or(Give(One USD),
Give(One EUR)))
After(t+2, Scale(1, (One GBP)))
)
John wants to acquire a contract before moment t that gives him a later choice
(between wheat and corn). He pays back 1 GBP as incentive for eventual owners
after t+2. Unfortunately, John issues a contract with bugs.
Suppose that a dishonest participant, Mallory, joins the contract and triggers
the execution of And. First, Before is executed and its enclosed contract (i.e.,
Or) produces a new contract - a future option - whose execution can be triggered
later by Mallory. Second, the After primitive gets executed, and John will pay
1 GBP after moment t+2.
The contract generated by After has all the aforementioned properties:
(CM), (ES), and (AS). Mallory is able to request 1 GBP from John after t+2,
and John cannot deny or retract from that.
Unfortunately, the future option contract generated by Or violates (AS):
because Mallory is the owner of this contract, she decides not to join that
contract. So, John cannot claim anything from Mallory and losses money.
In Section 4, we show a possible fix of OPT and we prove that in the fixed
contract John has the option to choose the products.
3. A formal semantics of Findel in Coq
3.1. Syntax
The syntax of Findel is fairly small in size and it is encoded in Coq using
Inductive (Figure 2):
Inductive Primitive :=
(* basic primitives *)
| Zero : -> Primitive
| One :Currency -> Primitive
(* composite primitives *)
| Scale :nat -> Primitive -> Primitive
| ScaleObs :Address -> Primitive -> Primitive
| Give :Primitive -> Primitive
| And :Primitive -> Primitive -> Primitive
| Or :Primitive -> Primitive -> Primitive
| If :Address -> Primitive -> Primitive -> Primitive
| Timebound :nat->nat -> Primitive -> Primitive.
Figure 2: The syntax of Findel in Coq.
Currencies are defined using Inductive as well:
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Inductive Currency :=
| USD : Currency
| EUR : Currency
| GBP : Currency
| JPY : Currency
| CNY : Currency
| SGD : Currency
| NONE : Currency.
The additional primitives At, Before, After, and Sell are simple definitions:
Definition At (t:nat) (p:Primitive) := Timebound (t - δ) (t + δ) p.
Definition Before (t:nat) (p:Primitive) :=Timebound 0 t p.
Definition After (t:nat) (p:Primitive) :=Timebound t INF p.
δ is a just parameter which is used to adjust intervals for accepting transactions.
The infinite is axiomatised in Coq as follows:
Parameter INF : nat.
Axiom infinite : forall n, n < INF.
Example 3.1. When written in Coq, contracts look very similar to what they
looked before. The contract shown in Section 2.1.1, is encoded in Coq as follows:
OPT =∆ (And
(Before t (Or (Give (One USD),
(Give (One EUR))))
(At t+2 (Scale 1 (One GBP))))
3.2. The semantics of Findel primitives
As mentioned in [9], contracts are executed recursively. In [5], a function
called execute calls an internal function executeRecursive that actually exe-
cutes the contract recursively. The Or primitive needs an extra-argument pro-
vided by the owner, and this is handled by yet another function executeOr
which calls execute on the primitives specified by the extra-argument.
Addresses. Time. Balance. An address in Findel is represented by a 20-byte
value. From our perspective, these are just numbers, and this is why we model
addresses as naturals. We make the following convention: 0 is treated as the
constant 0x0, i.e, 0 is the default address. The time is represented as the number
of seconds that passed since a given timestamp. The balance is a function which
takes an address and a currency, and returns an integer value representing the
amount of tokens of the specified currency. An update function for balance
is also provided: it takes an existing balance, an address, a currency and an
amount, and produces a new balance.
Gateway. Gateways are the solution that the designers of Findel found to model
interactions with external data providers. Gateways are smart contracts that
provide a value, a timestamp, and a proof of authenticity. Before executing a
contract, the gateway should be always updated [9]. In Coq, a gateway is a
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triple holding an address, a value and a timestamp:
Record Gateway :=
gateway {
gtw_addr : Address;
gtw_value : nat;
gtw_timestamp : nat
}.
Contracts have access to a list of such triples. When a contract queries an
address, the address is searched in the list, and the corresponding value and
timestamp are returned. If the address is not found, then the execution of the
contract fails. This functionality is provided by a Coq function called query.
This function also checks for the freshness of the given data, and fails if the
difference between the current time and the provided timestamp is less than
a threshold3. The proof of authenticity mechanism is not yet implemented
in Tikhomirov [5] and we do not handle it in Coq either.
Transactions. For every transfer of tokens a transaction is registered in a ledger.
A transaction is a uniquely identified tuple containing: the id of the contract
which generated the transfer, the addresses of the participants, the amount of
currency transferred, and a timestamp:
Definition Id := nat.
Record Transaction :=
transaction {
tr_id : Id;
tr_ctr_id : nat;
tr_from: Address;
tr_to : Address;
tr_amount : nat;
tr_currency : Currency;
tr_timestamp : Time
}.
Notation 3.1. We use { tx : I→ O ; V C ; c } to denote a transaction tx where
(tr from tx ) = I, (tr to tx ) = O, (tr amount tx ) = V , (tr currency tx ) = C,
and (tr ctr id tx ) = id(c), where c generated tx .
Contract descriptions vs. Findel contracts. Contract descriptions are separate
from contract instances. A description only defines what a contract is, not how
it is executed [9]. In Coq, a contract description has a unique id, and contains
the code (a tree of primitives), a scale factor, a gateway, and a time interval
specifying when this description is valid:
3In [5] this threshold is 30 seconds.
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Record ContractDescription :=
description {
dsc_id : Id;
dsc_prim : Primitive;
dsc_scale : nat;
dsc_gateway_of : list Gateway;
dsc_valid_from : Time;
dsc_valid_until : Time;
}.
Notation 3.2. Let us consider that d is a contract description. In the rest
of the section we use the following notations id(d) =∆ (dsc id d), prim(d) =∆
(dsc prim d),G(d) =∆ (dsc gateway of d), sc(d) =∆ (dsc scale d), vfrom(d) =
(dsc valid fromd), vuntil(d) = (dsc valid untild).
According to [9], Findel contracts are tuples consisting of a description and
two addresses (the issuer and the owner). However, for execution, we need more
ingredients, as indicated by the implementation in [5]:
Record FinContract :=
finctr {
ctr_id : Id;
ctr_desc_id : Id;
ctr_primitive : Primitive;
ctr_issuer : Address;
ctr_owner : Address;
ctr_proposed_owner : Address;
ctr_scale : nat;
}.
When a Findel contract is issued, the description id, the code and the scale
are initialised with the corresponding fields from the description. The proposed
owner is either the default value or it is set to a particular address.
Notation 3.3. Let c be a contract. We use the following notations id(c) =∆
(ctr id c), dsc(c) =∆ (ctr desc id c), prim(c) =∆ (ctr primitive c), issuer(c) =∆
(ctr issuer c), owner(c) =∆ (ctr owner c), po(c) =∆ (ctr proposed owner c),
sc(c) =∆ (ctr scale c).
Notation 3.4. We use 〈 c : I → O ; P 〉 to denote a contract c where
issuer(c) = I, po(c) = O, and prim(c) = P .
Results. A result stores the outcome of the execution of a contract. It contains
the updated balance, the issued contracts, the next available id, and the up-
dated ledger:
Record Result :=
result {
res_balance : Balance;
res_contracts : list FinContract;
res_next : Id;
res_ledger : list Transaction
}.
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3.2.1. The execute function.
The code of a Findel contract is executed recursively. In Coq we define a
function called execute which corresponds to the executeRecursive function
from [5]. The inputs of execute are:
• the primitive to be executed;
• the scale factor;
• the addresses of the issuer and the owner;
• the balance of the participants;
• the current time (received from the network);
• the list of available gateways;
• the contract id and the description id;
• the next available fresh identifier - which is used to assign identifiers to
the generated contracts, if any;
• the ledger, i.e., a list of transactions.
The output of execute is of type Result. The execution of a contract can
produce a new balance, can generate new contracts, can compute new fresh
ids, and can register new transactions in the ledger. The fresh id generation
mechanism is quite simple: execute takes a fresh id as input and uses it as
a seed for generating unique identifiers for new contracts. In Section 3.4 we
prove that our id generation mechanism is consistent, i.e., the generated ids are
unique.
The execute function is recursive on P:
match P with
• if P is Zero, then nothing changes:
| Zero => Some (result balance [] n ledger)
• if P is One, the balance of the participants is updated, new transactions
are added to the ledger, a new fresh id is generated:
| One currency => Some
(result
(update
(update balance I currncy
((balance I crncy)-(Z_of_nat scale))
)
O currency
((balance O crncy)+(Z_of_nat scale))
) [] (S nextId)
((transaction nextId ctr_id I O scale
crncy time) :: ledger)
)
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• if P is Scale, then scale the value of the contract:
| Scale k c =>
(execute c (scale * k) I O balance time
gtw ctr_id dsc_id n ledger)
• if P is ScaleObs, then the scale for the contract is updated only if the
gateway query does not fail:
| ScaleObs addr c =>
match (query gtw addr time) with
| None => None
| Some k =>
(execute c (scale * k) I O balance time
gtw ctr_id dsc_id n ledger)
end
• if P is Give, then swap the issuer and the owner:
| Give c =>
(execute c scale O I balance time
gtw ctr_id dsc_id n ledger)
• if P is And, then execute the contracts sequentially; And fails if at least one
of its subcontracts fails:
| And c1 c2 =>
match (execute c1 scale I O balance time
gtw ctr_id dsc_id n ledger)
with
| None => None
| Some (result bal1 Is1 n1 ledger1) =>
match (execute c2 scale I O bal1 time
gtw ctr_id dsc_id n1 ledger1)
with
| None => None
| Some (result bal2 Is2 n2 ledger2) =>
Some
(result bal2 (Is1 ++ Is2) n2 ledger2)
end
end
• if P is If, then the execution is determined by the gateway: if the gateway
query fails, then the execution fails; if the value is 0 then execute the
second contract; otherwise, execute the first contract.
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| If addr c1 c2 =>
match (query gtw addr time) with
| None => None
| Some v =>
if beq_nat v 0
then (execute c2 scale I O balance time
gtw ctr_id dsc_id n ledger)
else (execute c1 scale I O balance time
gtw ctr_id dsc_id n ledger)
end
• if P is Timebound, then execute the contract only if the current time is in
the time interval; if the current time is less than the inferior limit of the
interval, then a new contract is issued and added to the list of generated
contracts; otherwise, the execution fails:
| Timebound t0 t1 p =>
if (t1 <? time)
then None
else
if (t0 <? time)
then (execute p scale I O balance time
gtw ctr_id dsc_id n ledger)
else Some
(result balance
[(finctr (S n) dsc_id (Timebound t0 t1 p)
I O O scale)]
(S (S n)) ledger)
• if P is Or, then a new contract is issued with Or as root; the owner can
later demands its execution.
| Or c1 c2 => Some
(result balance
[(finctr (S n) dsc_id (Or c1 c2)
I O O scale)]
(S (S n)) ledger)
3.3. Execution model
The execution of a Findel contract may generate new contracts. We need
to model a ledger of transactions, the balance of the users, an other compo-
nents needed to run contracts. We define a general system state as a tuple
〈C,D,B, t,G, i,L, E〉, which holds: the list of issued contracts C, the list of avail-
able contract descriptions D, the balance for each user B, the current global
time t, a list of available gateways G, the next fresh identifier i, a ledger L and
a list of events E. In Coq, a state is represented as follows:
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Record State :=
state {
m_contracts : list FinContract;
m_descriptions : ContractDescriptions;
m_balance : Balance;
m_global_time : Time;
m_gateway : list Gateway;
m_fresh_id : Id;
m_ledger : list Transaction;
m_events : list Event
}.
Notation 3.5. We use the following notations (where s a State. ): C(s) =∆
(m contracts s), D(s) =∆ (m descriptions s), B(s) =∆ (m balance s), E(s) =∆
(m events s),L(s) =∆ (m ledger s), G(s) =∆ (m gateway s), fresh(s) = (m fresh id s),
time(s) = (m global time(s)).
The State is essentially holding all the ingredients of an online marketplace
for Findel derivatives. The marketplace evolves as specified by the following
rules:
[Issue] When issued, a contract c is added to the list of issued contracts having
a unique id i. Initially, the owner field contains the address of the issuer, while
the proposed owner field contains the address of the intended owner. If the value
of the proposed owner field is 0, then anyone can join this contract. prim(c) is
initialised from an existing description. Also an event IssuedFor is triggered,
and the global fresh id is incremented:
〈C,D,B, t,G, i,L, E〉
〈c : C,D,B, t,G, i+ 1,L, (IssuedFor O i) : E〉 d ∈ D,
where c is a contract with id(c) = i, dsc(c) = id(d), prim(c) = prim(d),
issuer(c) = I, owner(c) = I, po(c) = O, sc(c) = sc(d). The rule essentially
says that the state above the line changes into the state below the line. Also,
there is a side condition d ∈ D which needs to be fulfilled in order for the rule
to apply. We used ‘:’ to denote the cons list constructor, i.e., c is added in front
of the list of contracts C.
[Join] Joining a contract c is the most complex operation and requires several
conditions. First, (A) the owner O who wants to join is either the proposed
owner, that is, po(c) = O, or anyone can join, that is, po(c) = 0. Second,
(B) the root node of the contract primitive should not be an Or: prim(c) 6=
(Or ). Third, (C) the execution of c is limited within a time interval given
by its corresponding description d: vfrom(d) ≤ t ≤ vuntil(d). Here, t is the
current time. Finally, (D) the execution of the associated primitive should be
successful, that is, execute(prim(c), id(c), dsc(c), c(c), issuer(c), O , t , G, L, i)
= 〈B′, C′, i′,L′〉. The tuple 〈B′, C′, i′,L′〉 is a Result, where B′ is the updated
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balance, C′ is the list of contracts generated by the primitive, i′ is the new fresh
identifier, and L′ is the updated ledger. The rule for joining a contract is shown
below; note that E is enriched with event e = Executed id(c):
〈c ∈ C,D,B, t,G, i,L, E〉
〈C \ {c} ∪ C′,D,B′, t,G′, i′,L′, e : E〉 (A), (B), (C), (D)
Note that we use c ∈ C to denote that c is in the list of contracts, and C \ {c}
to denote that c is removed from C.
[Join OR] This rule handles the case when (B′) prim(c) = (Or c1 c2). In this
case, the owner can execute either c1 or c2. Let be a placeholder variable which
can be either c1 or c2. If the execution is successful, that is, (D
′) execute(,
id(c), dsc(c), c(c), issuer(c), O , t , G, L, i) = 〈B′, C′, i′,L′〉, then the rule below
applies:
〈c ∈ C,D,B, t,G, i,L, E〉
〈C \ {c} ∪ C′,D,B′, t,G′, i′,L′, e : E〉 (A), (B
′), (C), (D′)
Note that the conditions (A) and (C) need to be satisfied here as well. Again,
e = Executed id(c).
[Fail] If the execution of a contract fails, that is, (D′′) execute(, id(c), dsc(c),
c(c), issuer(c), O , t , G, L, i) = ⊥, then the event e′ = Deleted id(c) is triggered:
〈c ∈ C,D,B, t,G, i,L, E〉
〈C \ {c},D,B, t,G, i,L, e′ : E〉 (A), (C), (D
′′).
[Tick] The tick rule increments the global time t:
〈C,D,B′, t,G′, i′,L′, E〉
〈C,D,B′, t+ 1,G′, i′,L′, E〉
The rules [Join], [Join OR], and [Fail] cannot be applied in the same time
because their side conditions exclude each other. On the other hand, the rules
[Issue] and [Tick] can be applied any time. Also, note that [Join], [Join OR],
and [Fail] are the only rules that actually execute contracts and may produce
modifications in the balance, the ledger, and the list of events.
Definition 3.1. The rules above define a relation between states. By s y s′
we denote that there is a step (given by one of the rules [Issue], [Join], [Join
OR], [Fail], or [Tick]) from the state s to the state s′. We also use s  s′ to
denote the reflexive and transitive closure of y.
3.4. Metaproperties
State consistency. We start by defining what conditions need to be satisfied for
a state to be consistent.
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Definition 3.2. A state s is consistent if:
1. ∀c . c ∈ C(s)→ fresh(s) > id(c);
2. ∀i . (Executed i) ∈ E(s) ∨ (Deleted i) ∈ E(s)→ fresh(s) > i;
3. ∀c . c ∈ C(s)→ ((Executed id(c)) 6∈ E(s) ∧ (Deleted id(c)) 6∈ E(s));
4. ∀i .¬((Executed i) ∈ E(s) ∧ (Deleted i) ∈ E(s)).
The first two conditions capture the fact that the id field of the state is
always fresh, i.e., it always strictly greater than all the other identifiers. Since
we do not use hash functions to compute unique identifiers, we have ensure that
our unique identifier generation approach is consistent. The last two conditions
of Definition 3.2 capture the consistency of the generated events. Condition 3
ensures that an issued contract cannot be executed or deleted, while condition 4
ensures that a contract cannot be both executed and deleted in the same time.
The first important metaproperty that we prove is that the  relation pre-
serves state consistency:
Theorem 3.1. For all states s, s′, such that s is consistent, if s  s′ then s′
is consistent.
The Coq proof of this theorem is based on several lemmas which correspond to
each item in Definition 3.2. These lemmas are proved by induction on y.
Ledger consistency. One important property of the ledger is that the registered
transactions cannot be removed or modified. In Coq, we are able to prove this
for our semantics as well:
Theorem 3.2. For all states s and s′, and for all transactions t, if s s′ and
t ∈ L(s) then t ∈ L(s′).
The proof is based on the fact that the execute function only appends transac-
tions to the ledger, and it never modifies the existing transactions in the ledger.
Events consistency. They relation triggers several events: Executed, Deleted,
and IssuedFor. These events correspond to actions and once an event is trig-
gered it means that some action has been performed. For instance, when a
contract is issued an IssuedFor event is triggered, and a potential owner can
check whether a contract has been issued for him. This action cannot be re-
tracted. In Coq, we prove that triggered events cannot be retracted:
Theorem 3.3. For all states s and s′, and for all events e, if s  s′ and
e ∈ E(s) then e ∈ E(s′).
The proof is based on the fact that the execute function only generates new
events, and it never modifies the existing list of events.
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Other metaproperties. A very useful property that we intensively use in our Coq
proofs is given by the following lemma:
Lemma 3.1. For all states s and s′, and for all contracts c, if s y s′ and
c ∈ C(s) then c ∈ C(s′) or (Executed id(c)) ∈ E(s′) or (Deleted id(c) ∈ E(s′).
The lemma essentially enumerates the possible outcomes of a step from s to s′:
either a contract is not executed and it remains available in the contracts of
s′, or it is executed and a corresponding event was triggered. The proof is by
induction on y.
Another property that we prove in Coq is that the time cannot go backwards
when performing steps:
Lemma 3.2. For all s and s′, if s s′ then t(s) ≤ t(s′).
The proof is by induction on both  and y.
4. Verifying properties of Findel derivatives
In this section we verify the properties (CM), (ES), and (AS) for several
Findel derivatives. Sometimes, proofs cannot be completed. In this case we
prove a proposition that indicates a vulnerability.
All the subsequent properties are formalized and certified in Coq. The full
Coq codebase is available online at https://github.com/andreiarusoaie/
findel-semantics-coq. Since everything is already proved and verified in
Coq, we do not show any proofs in this section4.
For convenience, in the rest of this section, we assume that I is always the
issuer and O is always the owner. We explicitly mention when their roles change.
We also introduce some useful notations and definitions:
Notation 4.1. If P is a primitive, then we denote by cP the contract where
prim(cP) = P, issuer(cP) = I, owner(cP) = O, and id(cP) = id(P).
Definition 4.1. A contract c is executed between s1 and s2 at time t if c ∈
C(s1), Executed id(c) ∈ E(s2), time(s1) = t and s1 y s2.
Definition 4.2. A contract c is deleted between s1 and s2 at time t if c ∈ C(s1),
Deleted id(c) ∈ E(s2), time(s1) = t and s1 y s2.
Definition 4.3. An owner O joins a contract c between states s1 and s2 at
time t if there are states s and s′ such that s1  s, s′  s2 and c is executed
or deleted between s and s′ at time t.
4Most of the proofs are by induction on y or  , and can be found in the indicated
codebase.
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4.1. Fixed-rate currency exchange
Recall the fixed-rate currency exchange (FRCE ) shown in Example 2.1. We
prove in Coq that I receives 11 dollars from O, while O receives 10 euros from
I:
Proposition 4.1. For all s, s′, with s consistent, if O joins cFRCE between s
and s′ then there exists tx 1 such that { tx 1 : I → O ; 10 USD ; id(cFRCE ) }
∈ L(s′).
Proposition 4.2. For all s, s′, with s consistent, if O joins cFRCE between s
and s′ then there exists tx 2 such that { tx 2 : O → I ; 11 USD ; id(cFRCE ) }
∈ L(s′).
In Coq, we actually prove a more general version of these properties, where
the amounts are multiplied by the scale of the contract. These propositions
guarantee the (CM) and (AS) properties. (ES) does not make sense here be-
cause no external sources are used.
4.2. External rate currency exchange
A more interesting example is a currency exchange derivative where the
exchange rate is provided by an external source, i.e., a gateway:
ERCE =∆ And (Give (Scale n (One USD)))
(ScaleObs addr (Scale n (One EUR)))
An interesting question is what happens if the gateway fails to provide an ex-
change rate r? First, we prove that the expected transactions are generated if
the gateway successfully provides an exchange rate r:
Proposition 4.3. For all s, s′, with s consistent, if O joins cERCE between s
and s′, and query G(s) addr t = r then there exists tx 1 such that { tx 1 : I →
O ; sc(cERCE ) ∗ r USD ; id(cERCE ) } ∈ L(s′).
Proposition 4.4. For all s, s′, with s consistent, if O joins cERCE between s
and s′, and query G(s) addr t = r then there exists tx 2 such that { tx 2 : O →
I ; sc(cERCE ) EUR ; id(cERCE ) } ∈ L(s′).
Second, if the gateway query fails, we prove that the ledger remains un-
changed, that is, (ES):
Proposition 4.5. For all s, s′, with s consistent, if cERCE is executed (or
deleted) between s and s′ and query G(s) addr t(s) = None then L(s) = L(s′).
Thus, no transaction has been performed, and the balance of the users is not
affected by the gateway failure.
All the propositions in this section guarantee (CM), (ES), and (AS) for this
Findel derivative.
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4.3. Zero-coupon bond
Our next case study is the zero-coupon bond (Example 2.2), where the issuer
sells a zero-coupon bond that pays 11 USD in one year for 10 USD:
ZCB =∆
(
And
(Give (Scale (One USD) 10))
(At (now+t) (Scale (One USD) 11))
)
First, we are concerned about the rights of the issuer:
Proposition 4.6. For all s, s′, with s consistent, if O joins cZCB between s
and s′ then there is a transaction tx2 such that { tx2 : O → I ; sc(cZCB ) ∗ 10
USD ; id(cZCB ) } ∈ L(s′).
At generates a new contract which can be executed between now + t− δ
and now + t + δ (cf. Table 2). The owner gets paid only if he joins in this time
interval:
Proposition 4.7. For all s, s′, now, t, with s consistent, if O joins cZCB
between s and s′, and O joins the contract cOR generated by cZCB at t′ ∈
[now + t− δ, now + t + δ] then there is tx1 such that { tx1 : I→ O ; sc(cOR)∗11
USD ; id(cOR) } ∈ L(s′).
The hypotheses of the above proposition should be carefully considered: if O
does not join in time, the he does not receive 11 USD. The next proposition
reveals a security vulnerability (time constraints) that affects O:
Proposition 4.8. For all s, s′, now, t, with s consistent, if O joins cZCB
between s and s′ and O joins the contract cOR generated by cZCB at t′ >
now + t + δ then Deleted id(cOR) ∈ E(s′).
Deleted is generated by the [Fail] rule, so the ledger remains unchanged and
the owner does not get paid. So, for ZCB only the properties (CM) and (AS)
hold.
4.4. An option derivative
Recall the option derivative OPT from Section 2.1.1:
OPT =∆
(
And
(Before t (Or (Give (One USD)),
(Give (One EUR)))
(After t+2 (Scale 1 (One GBP)))
)
We explained in Section 2.1.1 that Mallory requests and receives 1 GBP after
t+2. This is proved by the next proposition:
Proposition 4.9. For all s, s′, t, with s consistent, if O joins cOPT between
s and s′ before t, and then O joins the contract cAfter generated by cOPT at t′
where t′ > t + 2, then there is tx1 such that { tx1 : I → O ; sc(cAfter ) GBP ;
id(cAfter ) } ∈ L(s′).
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This proposition ensures partially (only for the owner) the (CM) property.
However, it violates (AS):
Proposition 4.10. For all s, s′, with s consistent before t, if O joins cOPT
between s and s′ then O is the owner of any contract generated by cOPT .
So I is not the owner of the generated option derivative, and thus, O is the one
who decides whether or not to join the option contract. If O is honest then we
can prove:
Proposition 4.11. For all s, s′, with s consistent, if O joins cOPT between s
and s′ before t, and then O joins the contract cOr generated by cOPT after t,
then there is tx2 such that { tx2 : O → I ; sc(cOr )  ; id(cOr ) } ∈ L(s′),
where  ∈ {EUR, USD}.
Indeed, it is not acceptable for I to depend on O’s choice. A possible solu-
tion for fixing OPT is to replace (Or (Give (One USD)) (Give (One EUR))) with
(Give (Or (One USD) (One EUR))). Since the Give primitive swaps the roles of
the participants for the enclosed contracts, I becomes the owner, O becomes the
issuer, and thus, I can request the payment from O. With this change we can
prove the next propositions that ensure (CM), (AS), and (ES) for this contract:
Proposition 4.12. For all s, s′, with s consistent, if O joins cOPT ′ between
s and s′ before t, then I is the owner of the contract cOr generated by cOPT ′
whose primitive is (Or (One USD) (One EUR)) and its issuer is O.
Proposition 4.13. For all s, s′, with s consistent, if O joins cOPT ′ between s
and s′ before t, and then I joins cOr generated by cOPT ′ , then there is tx1 such
that { tx1 : O → I ; sc(cOr )  ; id(cOr ) } ∈ L(s′), where  ∈ {EUR, USD}.
4.5. Credit Default Swap
In this section we prove the properties (CM), (ES), and (AS) for a very
popular and real-life financial derivative type: credit default swap (CDS). This
type of derivative enables investors to swap credit risk with another investor.
Suppose that Alice buys a financial bond of value price from Bob. The maturity
of the bond is 3 years. Every year, Bob has to pay Alice a fee FY, and price
when maturity is reached. Alice wants to protect her investment: she joins a
CDS issued by a seller C with a better credit rating than Bob. For this, Alice
pays an yearly fee F to C. If Bob defaults, then C will pay to Alice the price
and the remaining fees:
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CDS =∆ (And
(* first year *)
(And
(Give (Scale F (One USD)))
(pay at t (now+1yr) addr
(price + (2 * FY)))
)
(And
(* second year *)
(yearly check (now+1yr)(now+2yrs)
addr price FY F 1)
(* third year *)
(yearly check (now+2yrs)(now+3yrs)
addr price FY F 0)
)
)
Since Findel does not allow contracts with three parties, we use a gateway
available at address addr that can tell whether Bob defaulted or not. Here we
take advantage of the compositionality of Findel: pay at t and yearly check
are Findel contracts as well. First, pay at t pays sum at time t if Bob defaulted:
pay at t =∆ (At t (If addr (Scale sum (One USD)) Zero))
We prove that pay at t has the following property:
Proposition 4.14. If Bob defaults at time t then the issuer of pay at t pays
sum to the owner. Otherwise, no transaction between the involved parties is
generated by contract pay at t.
Second, yearly check is more complex:
yearly check =∆At t (If addr Zero
(And (Give (Scale F (One USD)))
(pay at t t’ addr (price + i * FY))))
The contract describes the obligations that parties have at time t: if Bob de-
faulted at t, nothing happens. Otherwise, Alice pays F to C, and C pays price
+ i * FY at t’ if Bob defaults. The contract is intended to be used inside CDS:
at now + 1 year, Alice pays F to C, and at t’ = now + 2 years C pays price
+ 1 * FY to Alice if Bob defaulted at t’. We prove that in Coq:
Proposition 4.15. If Bob defaults at time t, then yearly check does not
generate any transactions. If Bob does not default at t then the issuer receives
fee F from the owner and a pay at at t’ (price + i * FY) contract with
the same owner is generated.
Here, i is the number of fees left to be paid until maturity is reached. For
instance, if Bob defaults at now + 1 year then C pays to Alice price+2*FY.
The financial obligations of C to Alice when Bob defaults are summarized
by Table 4.5. The same table lists the financial obligations of Alice to C. In Coq
we prove that the Findel specification of CDS ensures that these obligations are
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Bob defaults at Obligations of C to Alice
now + 1 year price + 2 * FY
now + 2 years price + 1 * FY
now + 3 years price
Timestamp Obligations of Alice to C
now F
now + 1 year F
now + 2 years F
Table 3: The financial obligations of the parties.
fullfilled by the parties. Moreover, we prove that no other finacial obligation is
generated by CDS.
The compositional nature of Findel contracts allows us to develop incremen-
tal proofs for CDS. In our proofs for CDS we reuse Propositions 4.14 and 4.15.
The proofs are broken into smaller pieces, and they become less difficult and
easier to manage.
5. Conclusions
The recent developments in the blockchain technologies, especially the sup-
port for smart contracts, are a perfect match for financial agreements. In partic-
ular, it makes sense to have DSLs for financial derivatives that run directly on
the blockchain, and thus, they are automatically processed by a decentralized
network. These languages are specially designed for people in finance. They can
focus on the specification rather than learning how to program smart contracts.
Expressing financial derivatives in a specialized DSL may be more precise and
less error prone than specifying them in a general purpose smart contracts lan-
guage [16]. Either way, mistakes in contracts can happen.
Our work is complementary to the efforts in previous research like [7] or [8],
where DSLs based on similar primitives as Findel were formalised only with
the purpose of making various analyses or estimating derivatives values. Findel
derivatives are executed in the blockchain, making derivatives susceptible of
several known vulnerabilities of smart contracts. Our infrastructure is meant to
help users to discover such vulnerabilities in their financial derivatives.
Future work. The main disadvantage of Coq is the fact that it is not fully
automatic. Other tools, like K [24], can help with automation. However, these
are not yet capable to generate certificates. On the other hand it is worth
investigating whether these tools are more practical than Coq.
Automation of proofs remains a challenge for our approach. Coq allows users
to define the so-called tactics which helps with improving the proof language.
Here we define several tactics that we use to discharge very common proof goals.
However, a deeper investigation on how to define specific tactics is required.
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Another piece of future work is an investigation on other financial DSLs
that run on the blockchain, where proving correctness of the encoded financial
agreements could help with finding security vulnerabilities.
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